@article{2019,title={A Quantitative Review of Central Bank Independence},abstractNode={Social welfare is one of the main objectives of the political economy. Social welfare emerges when employment and growth rates are at desired levels. The basis of a sustainable employment and growth policy is to ensure price stability. Price stability is the primary objective of central banks. The essential condition of central banks to ensure price stability and to effectively protect them from external factors is central bank independence. The debates on the independence of the central bank can undermine the reputation of the institution and affect social welfare. Macroeconomic imbalances, especially due to price instability, indirectly confront society and the central bank. Society sees political authority as responsible for the imbalance resulting from price instability. As a result of the society's confrontation with political authority, the political authority feels the need to establish a mechanism of pressure on the independence of the central bank. At this point, the starting point of this study is to quantitatively reveal the perspectives of demographic structures, income levels and political preferences on central bank independence. As a result of this study, there is a significant relationship between political preferences and the resignation / appointment of the chairman of the central bank, there is a significant relationship between political and income levels and perception of central bank independence, there is a significant relationship between political preferences and inflation expectations and all income levels have similar inflation expectations.},author={Özgür Bayram SOYLU},year={2019},journal={Turkish Studies-Economics,Finance,Politics}}